GEN. MCCHRYSTAL: WE'VE SHOT 'AN AMAZING NUMBER OF PEOPLE' WHO WERE NOT THREATS

GEN. MCCHRYSTAL: WE'VE SHOT 'AN AMAZING NUMBER OF PEOPLE' WHO WERE NOT THREATS

Great persian writings

http://ketabcha.blogfa.com/

This is ugly: honour killing

I have very strong feelings against this kind of disgusting “honorable act”: Killing your daughters because they had boyfriends. And you can expect that from a typical Muslim critical of western life style and their values. And this American-Egyptian Muslim did it.

Sarah, 17, and Amina Sayed, 18, were shot dead by their own father.

“Muslim leaders admitted a girl who did not wear the Hijab could bring shame to her family and her parents would be viwed as a failure in the community”.

I hate the gossip-mongering Afghans

I hate the gossip-mongering Afghans who got nothing nice to talk about except all crap. And most of them are that way. Most of them have that 'Afghan' attitute. Afghan attitute stands for gossiping, bigotry, nosy,dump and out of touch with the acadamic world.
If you are an Afghan, no one can save you from the gossips and rumour-spreading attitues of your fellow citizens given that you make the slighest mistake. Your mistake becomes headlines of their conversations and gossips. They continue to humiliate you for as long as they can and they enjoy that conduct. How pathetic bastards?

CFR: India's northen exposure

Council on foreign relations writes

India’s appetite for Afghan nuts and Kabul’s love for Bollywood may be reframing the geopolitics of the region. When Afghanistan joins the South Asia Free Trade Agreement in February 2008, it can start exporting a wide range of products to India at zero import duty. India has offered $750 million in aid to Kabul (Reuters) since 2001, making it the largest regional donor to Afghanistan. Besides helping to rebuild Afghan roads, airlines, and power plants, and providing support to the health and education sectors, New Delhi also seeks to spread its own brand of democracy in Kabul. Not only will future Afghan parliaments sit in a building that India helped construct, but Afghan civil servants, diplomats, and police officials will have received training from their Indian counterparts.
India and Afghanistan historically have shared close cultural and political ties. India supported successive governments in Kabul until the rise of the Taliban in 1992, viewed then—as now—as a front for radical Pakistani interests in the region. Afghanistan holds strategic importance for India in more ways than one. India hopes for transmission lines bringing electricity from Central Asia, as well as a pipeline for oil and gas. There is also an Iranian-Indian venture to develop a port (Economist) in the Gulf of Oman, which will require road links across Afghan territory.
By helping to rebuild a new Afghanistan, India strives toward more regional stability, but also hopes to counter Pakistan’s influence in Kabul. India wants new land routes to be able to move goods to Afghanistan, bypassing Pakistan. “Pakistan is wary of providing a land route to India, since the two countries are competing for the same consumer-goods market in Afghanistan,” says an op-ed in Pakistan’s Daily Times. Pakistan currently allows Afghanistan the transit rights for its exports to India, but does not allow goods to move from India to Afghanistan.
Pakistan and Afghanistan have a tumultuous relationship owing to their controversial shared border and ethnic populations. Afghanistan alleges militant groups spreading insurgency within its borders receive refuge in Pakistan’s tribal lands. As part of its Afghan policy, Pakistan always has sought to support a client regime in Kabul, explains a new Backgrounder. Pakistan’s military establishment has always approached the various wars in and around Afghanistan as a function of its main institutional and national security interests: “first and foremost, balancing India,” writes Afghanistan expert Barnett R. Rubin in Foreign Affairs.
It is no surprise then that Pakistan sees India’s increasing influence in Afghanistan as a threat. The opening of Indian consulates in Afghanistan was decried by Islamabad, which alleged that Indian intelligence agents in these consulates were funneling weapons and funds to opposition groups in Pakistan, in particular the insurgency in Balochistan. Pakistan is also suspicious (PDF) of India’s placement of troops in Afghanistan, writes Frederick Grare at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. (The killing of an Indian employee by the Taliban in November 2005 prompted the dispatch of approximately two hundred Indo-Tibetan Border Police commandos to Afghanistan in March last year to provide security for Indians (RFE/RL) working in various construction projects in Afghanistan.)
Afghanistan now must walk a fine line to avoid becoming a pawn in a new proxy war between India and Pakistan. Given the geopolitical realities of the region, it can neither spurn India’s aid nor afford to antagonize Pakistan. A report by the United States Institute of Peace suggests India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan must “keep the India-Pakistan dispute out of Afghanistan’s bilateral relations with both

Hazaras in Australia: are they true refujees?

Dr. William Malley, professor of political science at university of New South Wales has compliled an excellent report on the set of historical events that has made Hazaras flee their homeland and seek asylum around the world. He focuses on Hazara asylum seekers in Australia. In the end, he concludes that Hazaras have not only been prosecupted in Afghanistan because of their religious affiliations and distint racial features but also by Australia's bureaucrats in John Howard's cabinet.

Enemies of education and peace

Lately, the media has confirmed that Afghanistan's central government is imposing sanctions on how much people are allowed to learn. The government has adopted it arrogant approach in reaction to Jaghori's (a small suburb within province of Ghazni in Afghanistan) outstanding performance in the number of university graduates. Jaghori is a relatively small suburb....Most of people have their income from friends, relatives or family members who live in developed and developing countries. People are financially well-off compared to other parts of Afghanistan. People use the newly-found wealth to send their children to school...indeed Jaghori has one of the highest number of primary and secondary students. An outstanding number of secondary school graduates have enrolled at Afghanistan's top universities, from Jaghori alone. The number of university graduates from Jaghori is so overhelming that even the government has introduced measures to slow down the number of people getting into university. One of these measures include harassing the secondary school teachers for their wages and salaries. It has started paying them on irregulat basis rathar than regular basis...in hope to reduce the number of teachers in active service and therefore make the schools less effective in performance. They also have tried to cut down the number of secondary and primary shcools down from 80 to 25. This is despite the fact more and more children are trying to get a secondary education, at least.

I will write about this more......Is Afghanistan's puppet president a terrorist who wants to deny the public a good education? or is he a progressive thinker who wants to get Afghanistan's economic growth and social harmoney and reconcialliation? i think he fits into the first category. Bastard Karzai.

Hillary Clinton Foreign policy

Senator Hillary Clinton of New York, the next most likely president of the United States has published her foreign policy doctrine on foreignaffairs.org :
Title of her thesis is " Security and oppurtunity for 21st century "

To lead, a great nation must command the respect of others. America has been respected in the past as a powerful nation, a purposeful nation, and a generous and warm-hearted nation. In my travels around the world as senator and as first lady, I have met people from all walks of life. I have seen firsthand how many of our past policies have earned us respect and gratitude.

The tragedy of the last six years is that the Bush administration has squandered the respect, trust, and confidence of even our closest allies and friends. At the dawn of the twenty-first century, the United States enjoyed a unique position. Our world leadership was widely accepted and respected, as we strengthened old alliances and built new ones, worked for peace across the globe, advanced nonproliferation, and modernized our military. After 9/11, the world rallied behind the United States as never before, supporting our efforts to remove the Taliban in Afghanistan and go after the al Qaeda leadership. We had a historic opportunity to build a broad global coalition to combat terror, increase the impact of our diplomacy, and create a world with more partners and fewer adversaries.

But we lost that opportunity by refusing to let the UN inspectors finish their work in Iraq and rushing to war instead. Moreover, we diverted vital military and financial resources from the struggle against al Qaeda and the daunting task of building a Muslim democracy in Afghanistan. At the same time, we embarked on an unprecedented course of unilateralism: refusing to pursue ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, abandoning our commitment to nuclear nonproliferation, and turning our backs on the search for peace in the Middle East. Our withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol and refusal to participate in any international effort to deal with the tremendous challenges of climate change further damaged our international standing.

Our nation has paid a heavy price for rejecting a long-standing bipartisan tradition of global leadership rooted in a preference for cooperating over acting unilaterally, for exhausting diplomacy before making war, and for converting old adversaries into allies rather than making new enemies. At a moment in history when the world's most pressing problems require unprecedented cooperation, this administration has unilaterally pursued policies that are widely disliked and distrusted.

Yet it does not have to be this way. Indeed, our allies do not want it to be this way. The world still looks to the United States for leadership. American leadership is wanting, but it is still wanted. Our friends around the world do not want the United States to retreat. They want once again to be allied with the nation whose values, leadership, and strength have inspired the world for the last century.

To reclaim our proper place in the world, the United States must be stronger, and our policies must be smarter. The next president will have a moment of opportunity to restore America's global standing and convince the world that America can lead once again. As president, I will seize that opportunity by reintroducing ourselves to the world. I will rebuild our power and ensure that the United States is committed to building a world we want, rather than simply defending against a world we fear.

We should aim to lead our friends and allies in building a world of security and opportunity. America has long been the land of opportunity. But as we know at home and as we see today in Iraq and Afghanistan, opportunity cannot flourish without basic security. We must build a world in which security and opportunity go hand in hand, a world that will be safer, more prosperous, and more just.

We need more than vision, however, to achieve the world we want. We must face up to an unprecedented array of challenges in the twenty-first century, threats from states, nonstate actors, and nature itself. The next president will be the first to inherit two wars, a long-term campaign against global terrorist networks, and growing tension with Iran as it seeks to acquire nuclear weapons. The United States will face a resurgent Russia whose future orientation is uncertain and a rapidly growing China that must be integrated into the international system. Moreover, the next administration will have to confront an unpredictable and dangerous situation in the Middle East that threatens Israel and could potentially bring down the global economy by disrupting oil supplies. Finally, the next president will have to address the looming long-term threats of climate change and a new wave of global health epidemics.

To meet these challenges, we will have to replenish American power by getting out of Iraq, rebuilding our military, and developing a much broader arsenal of tools in the fight against terrorism. We must learn once again to draw on all aspects of American power, to inspire and attract as much as to coerce. We must return to a pragmatic willingness to look at the facts on the ground and make decisions based on evidence rather than ideology. [ end of page 1]

Leadership requires a blend of strategy, persuasion, inspiration, and motivation. It is based on respect more than fear. America's founders wrote the Declaration of Independence to explain our actions to the world out of a decent respect for the opinions of mankind. Gaining the respect of other nations today requires that we harness our might to a set of guiding principles.

Avoid false choices driven by ideology. The Bush administration has presented the American people with a series of false choices: force versus diplomacy, unilateralism versus multilateralism, hard power versus soft. Seeing these choices as mutually exclusive reflects an ideologically blinkered vision of the world that denies the United States the tools and the flexibility it needs to lead and succeed. There is a time for force and a time for diplomacy; when properly deployed, the two can reinforce each other. U.S. foreign policy must be guided by a preference for multilateralism, with unilateralism as an option when absolutely necessary to protect our security or avert an avoidable tragedy.

Use our military not as the solution to every problem but as one element in a comprehensive strategy. As president, I will never hesitate to use force to protect Americans or to defend our territory and our vital interests. We cannot negotiate with individual terrorists; they must be hunted down and captured or killed. Nor can diplomacy alone stop the perpetrators of genocide and crimes against humanity in places such as Darfur. But soldiers are not the answer to every problem. Using force in lieu of diplomacy compels our young men and women in uniform to carry out missions that they may not be trained or prepared for. And it ignores the value of simply carrying a big stick, rather than using it.

Make international institutions work, and work through them when possible. Contrary to what many in the current administration appear to believe, international institutions are tools rather than traps. The United States must be prepared to act on its own to defend its vital interests, but effective international institutions make it much less likely that we will have to do so. Both Republican and Democratic presidents have understood this for decades. When such institutions work well, they enhance our influence. When they do not work, their procedures serve as pretexts for endless delays, as in the case of Darfur, or descend into farce, as in the case of Sudan's election to the UN Commission on Human Rights. But instead of disparaging these institutions for their failures, we should bring them in line with the power realities of the twenty-first century and the basic values embodied in such documents as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Ensure that democracy delivers on its promises. Gnawing hunger, poverty, and the absence of economic prospects are a recipe for despair. Globalization is widening the gap between the haves and the have-nots within societies and between them. Today, there are more than two billion people living on less than $2 a day. These people risk becoming a vast permanent underclass. Calls for expanding civil and political rights in countries plagued by mass poverty and ruled by tiny wealthy elites will fall on deaf ears unless democracy actually delivers enough material benefits to improve people's lives. The Bush administration's policy in Iraq has temporarily given democracy a bad name, but over the long term the value of democracy will continue to inspire the world.

Stand for and live up to our values. The values that our founders embraced as universal have shaped the aspirations of millions of people around the world and are the deepest source of our strength -- but only as long as we live up to them ourselves. As we seek to promote the rule of law in other nations, we must accept it ourselves. As we counsel liberty and justice for all, we cannot support torture and the indefinite detention of individuals we have declared to be beyond the law.

A STRONGER AMERICA

Ending the war in Iraq is the first step toward restoring the United States' global leadership. The war is sapping our military strength, absorbing our strategic assets, diverting attention and resources from Afghanistan, alienating our allies, and dividing our people. The war in Iraq has also stretched our military to the breaking point. We must rebuild our armed services and restore them body and soul. [ end of page 2]

We must withdraw from Iraq in a way that brings our troops home safely, begins to restore stability to the region, and replaces military force with a new diplomatic initiative to engage countries around the world in securing Iraq's future. To that end, as president, I will convene the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the secretary of defense, and the National Security Council and direct them to draw up a clear, viable plan to bring our troops home, starting within the first 60 days of my administration.

While working to stabilize Iraq as our forces withdraw, I will focus U.S. aid on helping Iraqis, not propping up the Iraqi government. Financial resources will go only where they will be used properly, rather than to government ministries or ministers that hoard, steal, or waste them.

As we leave Iraq militarily, I will replace our military force with an intensive diplomatic initiative in the region. The Bush administration has belatedly begun to engage Iran and Syria in talks about the future of Iraq. This is a step in the right direction, but much more must be done. As president, I will convene a regional stabilization group composed of key allies, other global powers, and all the states bordering Iraq. Working with the newly appointed UN special representative for Iraq, the group will be charged with developing and implementing a strategy for achieving a stable Iraq that provides incentives for Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Turkey to stay out of the civil war.

Finally, we need to engage the world in a global humanitarian effort to confront the human costs of this war. We must address the plight of the two million Iraqis who have fled their country and the two million more who have been displaced internally. This will require a multibillion-dollar international effort under the direction of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. Meanwhile, the United States, along with governments in Europe and the Middle East, must agree to accept asylum seekers and help them return to Iraq when it is safe for them to do so.

As we redeploy our troops from Iraq, we must not let down our guard against terrorism. I will order specialized units to engage in targeted operations against al Qaeda in Iraq and other terrorist organizations in the region. These units will also provide security for U.S. troops and personnel in Iraq and train and equip Iraqi security services to keep order and promote stability in the country, but only to the extent that such training is actually working. I will also consider leaving some forces in the Kurdish area of northern Iraq in order to protect the fragile but real democracy and relative peace and security that have developed there, but with the clear understanding that the terrorist organization the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) must be dealt with and the Turkish border must be respected.

Getting out of Iraq will enable us to play a constructive role in a renewed Middle East peace process that would mean security and normal relations for Israel and the Palestinians. The fundamental elements of a final agreement have been clear since 2000: a Palestinian state in Gaza and the West Bank in return for a declaration that the conflict is over, recognition of Israel's right to exist, guarantees of Israeli security, diplomatic recognition of Israel, and normalization of its relations with Arab states. U.S. diplomacy is critical in helping to resolve this conflict. In addition to facilitating negotiations, we must engage in regional diplomacy to gain Arab support for a Palestinian leadership that is committed to peace and willing to engage in a dialogue with the Israelis. Whether or not the United States makes progress in helping to broker a final agreement, consistent U.S. involvement can lower the level of violence and restore our credibility in the region.

To help our forces recover from Iraq and prepare them to confront the full range of twenty-first-century threats, I will work to expand and modernize the military so that fighting wars no longer comes at the expense of deployments for long-term deterrence, military readiness, or responses to urgent needs at home. As the only senator serving on the Transformation Advisory Group established by the U.S. Joint Forces Command, I have had the chance to explore these issues in detail. Ongoing military innovation is essential, but the Bush administration has undermined this goal by focusing obsessively on expensive and unproven missile defense technology while making the tragically misguided assumption that light invasion forces could not only conquer the Taliban and Saddam Hussein but also stabilize Afghanistan and Iraq.

Our brave soldiers who are wounded in Afghanistan and Iraq must receive the health care, benefits, training, and support they deserve. The treatment of wounded soldiers at the Walter Reed Army Medical Center was a travesty. Those convalescing or struggling to build new lives after grievous injuries need an expanded version of the Family and Medical Leave Act to enable their families to provide the support they need. Beyond health care, it is also time to develop a modern GI Bill of Rights in order to expand professional and entrepreneurial opportunities as well as access to education and home ownership.

WINNING THE REAL WAR ON TERROR

We must be unrelenting in the prosecution of the war on al Qaeda and a growing number of like-minded extremist organizations. These terrorists are as determined as ever to strike the United States. If they think they can carry out another 9/11, I have no doubt that they will try. To stop them, we must use every tool we have.

In the cities of Europe and Asia -- such as Hamburg and Kuala Lumpur, which were the springboards for 9/11 -- terrorist cells are preparing for future attacks. We must understand not only their methods but their motives: a rejection of modernity, women's rights, and democracy, as well as a dangerous nostalgia for a mythical past. We must develop a comprehensive strategy focusing on education, intelligence, and law enforcement to counter not only the terrorists themselves but also the larger forces fueling support for their extremism.

The forgotten frontline in the war on terror is Afghanistan, where our military effort must be reinforced. The Taliban cannot be allowed to regain power in Afghanistan; if they return, al Qaeda will return with them. Yet current U.S. policies have actually weakened President Hamid Karzai's government and allowed the Taliban to retake many areas, especially in the south. A largely unimpeded heroin trade finances the very Taliban fighters and al Qaeda terrorists who are attacking our troops. In addition to engaging in counternarcotics efforts, we must seek to dry up recruiting opportunities for the Taliban by funding crop-substitution programs, a large-scale road-building initiative, institutions that train and prepare Afghans for honest and effective governance, and programs to enable women to play a larger role in society.

We must also strengthen the national and local governments and resolve the problems along Afghanistan's border. Terrorists are increasingly finding safe havens in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan. Redoubling our efforts with Pakistan would not only help root out terrorist elements there; it would also signal to our NATO partners that the war in Afghanistan and the broader fight against extremism in South Asia are battles that we can and must win. Yet we cannot succeed unless we design a strategy that treats the entire region as an interconnected whole, where crises overlap with one another and the danger of a chain reaction of disasters is real.

Combating terrorism around the world will require better intelligence and a clandestine service that is out on the street, not sitting behind desks. As president, I will work to restore morale in our intelligence community, increase the number of agents and analysts proficient in Arabic and other key languages, and raise the profile and status of intelligence analysis. Most of the terrorists apprehended for plotting attacks against the United States, both before and after 9/11, were arrested in other countries as a result of cooperation between intelligence and law enforcement agencies.

To maximize our effectiveness, we have to rebuild our alliances. The problem we face is global; we must therefore be attentive to the values, concerns, and interests of our allies and partners. That means doing a better job of building counterterrorist capacity around the world. We must help strengthen police, prosecutorial, and judicial systems abroad; improve intelligence; and implement more stringent border controls, especially in developing countries.

We must also keep our guard up at home. As a senator from New York, I have long advocated full investment in our first responders and in protecting our critical infrastructure. I have pushed for new strategies and new technologies, such as a new federal interoperable communications and safety system. After years of Bush administration neglect, 80 percent of the 9/11 Commission's recommendations on homeland security have now been enacted, principally as a result of the Democratic Congress' work. But there is more to do. We must match the resources to the stakes and help the most vulnerable and at-risk cities prepare for an attack. We must improve health-care delivery systems in order to manage the consequences of attacks. Finally, we must improve the security of chemical plants and safeguard the transportation of hazardous materials so that terrorists do not have easy targets.

SECURITY THROUGH STATESMANSHIP

The Bush administration has opposed talks with our adversaries, seeming to believe that we are not strong enough to defend our interests through negotiations. This is a misleading and counterproductive strategy. True statesmanship requires that we engage with our adversaries, not for the sake of talking but because robust diplomacy is a prerequisite to achieving our aims.

The case in point is Iran. Iran poses a long-term strategic challenge to the United States, our NATO allies, and Israel. It is the country that most practices state-sponsored terrorism, and it uses its surrogates to supply explosives that kill U.S. troops in Iraq. The Bush administration refuses to talk to Iran about its nuclear program, preferring to ignore bad behavior rather than challenge it. Meanwhile, Iran has enhanced its nuclear-enrichment capabilities, armed Iraqi Shiite militias, funneled arms to Hezbollah, and subsidized Hamas, even as the government continues to hurt its own citizens by mismanaging the economy and increasing political and social repression.

As a result, we have lost precious time. Iran must conform to its nonproliferation obligations and must not be permitted to build or acquire nuclear weapons. If Iran does not comply with its own commitments and the will of the international community, all options must remain on the table.

On the other hand, if Iran is in fact willing to end its nuclear weapons program, renounce sponsorship of terrorism, support Middle East peace, and play a constructive role in stabilizing Iraq, the United States should be prepared to offer Iran a carefully calibrated package of incentives. This will let the Iranian people know that our quarrel is not with them but with their government and show the world that the United States is prepared to pursue every diplomatic option.

Like Iran, North Korea responded to the Bush administration's effort to isolate it by accelerating its nuclear program, conducting a nuclear test, and building more nuclear weapons. Only since the State Department returned to diplomacy have we been able, belatedly, to make progress.

Neither North Korea nor Iran will change course as a result of what we do with our own nuclear weapons, but taking dramatic steps to reduce our nuclear arsenal would build support for the coalitions we need to address the threat of nuclear proliferation and help the United States regain the moral high ground. Former Secretaries of State George Shultz and Henry Kissinger, former Defense Secretary William Perry, and former Senator Sam Nunn have called on the United States to "rekindle the vision," shared by every president from Dwight Eisenhower to Bill Clinton, of reducing reliance on nuclear weapons.

To reassert our nonproliferation leadership, I will seek to negotiate an accord that substantially and verifiably reduces the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals. This dramatic initiative would send a strong message of nuclear restraint to the world, while we retain enough strength to deter others from trying to match our arsenal. I will also seek Senate approval of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by 2009, the tenth anniversary of the Senate's initial rejection of the agreement. This would enhance the United States' credibility when demanding that other nations refrain from testing. As president, I will support efforts to supplement the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Establishing an international fuel bank that guaranteed secure access to nuclear fuel at reasonable prices would help limit the number of countries that pose proliferation risks.

In the Senate, I have introduced legislation to accelerate and reinvigorate U.S. efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism. As president, I will do everything in my power to ensure that nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and the materials needed to make them are kept out of terrorists' hands. My first goal would be to remove all nuclear material from the world's most vulnerable nuclear sites and effectively secure the remainder during my first term in office.

Statesmanship is also necessary to engage countries that are not adversaries but that are challenging the United States on many fronts. Russian President Vladimir Putin has thwarted a carefully crafted UN plan that would have put Kosovo on a belated path to independence, attempted to use energy as a political weapon against Russia's neighbors and beyond, and tested the United States and Europe on a range of nonproliferation and arms reduction issues. Putin has also suppressed many of the freedoms won after the fall of communism, created a new class of oligarchs, and interfered deeply in the internal affairs of former Soviet republics.

It is a mistake, however, to see Russia only as a threat. Putin has used Russia's energy wealth to expand the Russian economy, so that more ordinary Russians are enjoying a rising standard of living. We need to engage Russia selectively on issues of high national importance, such as thwarting Iran's nuclear ambitions, securing loose nuclear weapons in Russia and the former Soviet republics, and reaching a diplomatic solution in Kosovo. At the same time, we must make clear that our ability to view Russia as a genuine partner depends on whether Russia chooses to strengthen democracy or return to authoritarianism and regional interference.

Our relationship with China will be the most important bilateral relationship in the world in this century. The United States and China have vastly different values and political systems, yet even though we disagree profoundly on issues ranging from trade to human rights, religious freedom, labor practices, and Tibet, there is much that the United States and China can and must accomplish together. China's support was important in reaching a deal to disable North Korea's nuclear facilities. We should build on this framework to establish a Northeast Asian security regime.

But China's rise is also creating new challenges. The Chinese have finally begun to realize that their rapid economic growth is coming at a tremendous environmental price. The United States should undertake a joint program with China and Japan to develop new clean-energy sources, promote greater energy efficiency, and combat climate change. This program would be part of an overall energy policy that would require a dramatic reduction in U.S. dependence on foreign oil.

We must persuade China to join global institutions and support international rules by building on areas where our interests converge and working to narrow our differences. Although the United States must stand ready to challenge China when its conduct is at odds with U.S. vital interests, we should work for a cooperative future.

STRENGTHENING ALLIANCES

It is important to engage our adversaries but even more important to reassure our allies. We must reestablish our traditional relationship of confidence and trust with Europe. Disagreements are inevitable, even among the closest friends, but we can never forget that on most global issues we have no more trusted allies than those in Europe. The new administration will have a chance to reach out across the Atlantic to a new generation of leaders in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. When America and Europe work together, global objectives are within our means.

In Asia, India has a special significance both as an emerging power and as the world's most populous democracy. As co-chair of the Senate India Caucus, I recognize the tremendous opportunity presented by India's rise and the need to give the country an augmented voice in regional and international institutions, such as the UN. We must find additional ways for Australia, India, Japan, and the United States to cooperate on issues of mutual concern, including combating terrorism, cooperating on global climate control, protecting global energy supplies, and deepening global economic development.

At our peril, the Bush administration has neglected our neighbors to the south. We have witnessed the rollback of democratic development and economic openness in parts of Latin America. We must return to a policy of vigorous engagement; this is too critical a region for the United States to stand idly by. We must support the largest developing democracies in the region, Brazil and Mexico, and deepen economic and strategic cooperation with Argentina and Chile. We must also continue to cooperate with our allies in Colombia, Central America, and the Caribbean to combat the interconnected threats of drug trafficking, crime, and insurgency. Finally, we must work with our allies to provide sustainable-development programs that promote economic opportunity and reduce inequality for the citizens of Latin America.

Equally important are the growing ranks of democracies in Africa -- some established, some new -- which will be the engines of Africa's future. We should target these countries for aid and other forms of support and work with them to strengthen regional institutions such as the African Union. The AU seeks to emulate the European Union by requiring and supporting democracy among its members, but it has a long way to go. It has thus far failed even to denounce the blatant political corruption and brutality of Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe. It must also develop the ability to act with sufficient strength and speed to stop mass atrocities, such as those in Darfur.

Our interests in Africa are strategic, not just humanitarian. They include al Qaeda's efforts to seek safe havens in failed states in the Horn of Africa and the growing competition with other global players, including China, for Africa's natural resources. The long-term solution, for us as well as for Africa, is to help Africans develop both the will and the capability to address their own problems and help the continent live up to its vast potential.

BUILDING THE WORLD WE WANT

To build the world we want, we must begin by speaking honestly about the problems we face. We will have to talk about the consequences of our invasion of Iraq for the Iraqi people and others in the region. We will have to talk about Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib. We will also have to take concrete steps to enhance security and spread opportunity throughout the world.

Education is the foundation of economic opportunity and should lie at the heart of America's foreign assistance efforts. More than 100 million children in the developing world are not in school. Another 150 million drop out before they finish grade school. By failing these children, we sow the seeds of lost generations. As president, I will press for quick passage of the Education for All Act, which would provide $10 billion over a five-year period to train teachers and build schools in the developing world. This program would channel funds to those countries that provide the best plans for how to use them and rigorously measure performance to ensure that our dollars deliver results for children.

The fight against HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, and other dreaded diseases is both a moral imperative and a practical necessity. These diseases have created a generation of orphans and set back economic and political progress by decades in many countries.

These problems often seem overwhelming, but we can solve them with the combined resources of governments, the private sector, nongovernmental organizations, and charities such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. We can set specific targets in areas such as expanding access to primary education, providing clean water, reducing child and maternal mortality, and reversing the spread of HIV/AIDS and other diseases. We can strengthen the International Labor Organization in order to enforce labor standards, just as we strengthened the World Trade Organization to enforce trade agreements. Such policies demonstrate that by doing good we can do well. This sort of investment and diplomacy will yield results for the United States, building goodwill even in places where our standing has suffered.

We must also take threats and turn them into opportunities. The seemingly overwhelming challenge of climate change is a prime example. Far from being a drag on global growth, climate control represents a powerful economic opportunity that can be a driver of growth, jobs, and competitive advantage in the twenty-first century. As president, I will make the fight against global warming a priority. We cannot solve the climate crisis alone, and the rest of the world cannot solve it without us. The United States must reengage in international climate change negotiations and provide the leadership needed to reach a binding global climate agreement. But we must first restore our own credibility on the issue. Rapidly emerging countries, such as China, will not curb their own carbon emissions until the United States has demonstrated a serious commitment to reducing its own through a market-based cap-and-trade approach.

We must also help developing nations build efficient and environmentally sustainable domestic energy infrastructures. Two-thirds of the growth in energy demand over the next 25 years will come from countries with little existing infrastructure. Many opportunities exist here as well: Mali is electrifying rural communities with solar power, Malawi is developing a biomass energy strategy, and all of Africa can provide carbon credits to the West.

Finally, we must create formal links between the International Energy Agency and China and India and create an "E-8" international forum modeled on the G-8. This group would be comprised of the world's major carbon-emitting nations and hold an annual summit devoted to international ecological and resource issues.

The world we want is also a world where human rights are respected. By surrendering our values in the name of our safety, the Bush administration has left Americans wondering whether its rhetoric about freedom around the world still applies back home. We have undercut international support for fighting terrorism by suggesting that the job cannot be done without humiliation, infringements on basic rights to privacy and free speech, and even torture. We must once again make human rights a centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy and a core element of our conception of democracy.

Human rights will never truly be realized as long as a majority of the world's population is still treated as second-class citizens. Twelve years ago, the UN convened a historic conference on women in Beijing, where I was proud to represent our country and to proclaim that women's rights are human rights. Since then, women have been elected heads of state in countries on nearly every continent. Thanks to the United States, many, but not yet all, Afghan women have been liberated from one of the most tyrannical and repressive regimes of our day and are now in schools, in the work force, and in parliament.

Yet progress in key areas has lagged, as evidenced by the continuing spread of trafficking in women, the ongoing use of rape as an instrument of war, the political marginalization of women, and persistent gender gaps in employment and economic opportunity. U.S. leadership, including a commitment to incorporate the promotion of women's rights in our bilateral relationships and international aid programs, is essential not just to improving the lives of women but to strengthening the families, communities, and societies in which they live.

REVIVING THE AMERICAN IDEA

Seasoned, clear-eyed leadership can take us far. We must draw on all the dimensions of American power and reject false choices driven by ideology rather than facts. An America that rebuilds its strength and recovers its principles will be an America that can spread the blessings of security and opportunity around the world.

In 1825, 50 years after the Battle of Bunker Hill, the great secretary of state Daniel Webster laid the cornerstone of the Bunker Hill Monument that stands today in Boston. He exulted in the simple fact that America had survived and flourished, and he celebrated "the benefit which the example of our country has produced, and is likely to produce, on human freedom and human happiness." He gloried not in American power but rather in the power of the American idea, the idea that "with wisdom and knowledge men may govern themselves." And he urged his audience, and all Americans, to maintain this example and "take care that nothing may weaken its authority with the world."

Two centuries later, our economic power and military might have grown beyond anything that our forefathers could have imagined. But that power and might can only be sustained and renewed if we can regain our authority with the world, the authority not simply of a large and wealthy nation but of the American idea. If we can live up to that idea, if we can exercise our power wisely and well, we can make America great again.

Not everyone agrees with Hillary on Middle East issues.

A few good links from different categories:

History News Network: HNN

Foreign Affairs

I hate politics

Australian navy

Observe Australian navy's movement for a period of one year as it moves throughout the world and around Australia. HeRE

Real Evils

The Field of Battle by Robin Blacburn

It is inherent in the concept of a terrorist act that it aims at an effect very much larger than the direct physical destruction it causes. Proponents of what used to be called the 'propaganda of the deed' also believed that in the illuminating glare of terror the vulnerability of a corrupt order would be starkly revealed. Once corruption and oppression were stripped away, a sacred or natural order--the nation, the religious community, the people--would come into its own.

The instigators of September 11 brought off a far more spectacular coup than any exponent of the propaganda of the deed, threaten more than a dozen of the world's most autocratic and corrupt rulers and aim to summon to arms a religious community of well over a billion people. The resources disposed of by these men transcend those traditionally associated with terrorism and are closer to those of a small state, but a state without boundaries whose headquarters hops from country to country.

Given the extent of the destruction wrought by the September 11 attack it is sobering to realise that the effect aimed at is qualitatively larger, namely that of re-ordering world politics around a 'clash of civilisations', allowing the Islamic world to free itself of all infidel trammels. Whether the strategic director of the Al Qaeda network is Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri or someone else, their aim from the outset was to provoke the United States into a counter-reaction that would alienate Muslim opinion; to expose the hypocrisy of the hereditary and autocratic rulers of the Muslim world; to create conditions in which the forces of Islamic jihad could seize or manipulate power in one or another of the larger or more significant Muslim states.

The new Caliphates at which they aim might appear a medieval fantasy but are to be equipped with the military and financial resources of modernity. They urge believers to consider the awesome power of Muslim leaders equipped with Islamic virtue, oil and nuclear weapons. Given the frustrated or desperate condition of much of the Muslim world, this is a message that has great resonance even amongst Muslims who are uneasy at, or repelled by, terror actions. The message targets the military actions and dispositions of the United States and Israel, especially as they are deemed to encroach on Muslim holy places, but it is also aimed at the existing governments of the Islamic world, seen as pawns of the West.

The September 11 attack invited a response and Al Qaeda did little to cover its tracks. The leaders of Al Qaeda, and those close to them in the Taliban leadership, may have felt that they needed to widen the conflict and escape the problems of famine and drought. The latter were forcing them into dependency on the international aid agencies and the US anti-drug program. In such desperate circumstances the goal of Al Qaeda was probably to draw the United States into the Afghan minefield while boosting its position elsewhere in the Muslim world.

The US president responded to September 11 by proclaiming a global, US-led 'war on terrorism'. Washington sought every conceivable ally or partner but insisted on retaining complete control of its 'war'. The UN and the Security Council were asked to support the US effort, and each of their members to help in whatever way they could, but there was to be no formal anti-terrorism coalition and no supranational organisation to embody it. If this is the new 'cold war', as some have suggested, it is very differently structured. On one side there is the world's most powerful state, with its 20th century weapons systems and a global system of alliances. On the other there is a terror network of perhaps no more than a few thousand men, acting as a self-proclaimed 'Muslim vanguard', but occasionally able to ignite the resentments and frustrations of tens or even hundreds of millions in the Islamic world. At the height of the Cold War the Communist states ruled one third of the world's population, had military means that seemed a match for those of its global competitor and believed that they could beat the capitalist west at its own game of economic growth. Al Qaeda may have the economic and military resources of a statelet but it aims to shape the thinking of a civilisation. Its members are drawn from many nationalities and have been active in Central Asia, the Balkans, Europe, North America, Kashmir, China, Indonesia and the Phillippines as well as the Middle East and Africa. Its ideology is fuelled by a sense of injury and wounded pride rather than material aspiration. It is virulently anti-infidel and misogynist, anti-secular without being at all anti-capitalist, and egalitarian without being democratic. Islamic civilisation has always left great scope for mercantile capitalism. The neo-fundamentalism of the eighties and nineties, forged in a battle with godless Communism and in reaction to royalist bureaucracy and corruption, accentuated this legacy by basing itself on strong and responsible Islamic business and faith-based charity. While prepared to work with a variety of Islamic political authorities the project of Al Qaeda transcends such boundaries aiming to unite the faithful against the infidels who have insulted and oppressed Islam.

In World War II liberal capitalism and autocratic Communism fought as allies against fascism. But in the postwar period the West feared a loss of control in the Middle East and so it allied with the most conservative forces in the Islamic world. The Saudi and Iranian monarchies were chosen as the strategic allies needed to protect Middle Eastern oil resources while secular nationalists like Mossadegh in Iran or Kassem in Iraq were destabilised and replaced. In fact the Western system of alliances is not simply a relic of the Cold War but rather a palimpsest that reflects, layer on layer, a longer history and a colonialism that mummified an extraordinary collection of archaic or pseudo-archaic regimes. This embraces Saudi Arabia with its 30,000-strong Royal Family, the Shaikhs of Bahrein, Qattar and Kuwait, the Sultan of Oman, and the Emirates--boasting the world's longest-serving head of state, Shaikh Sakir al-Qasimi of Ras al-Khaimah, who ascended his throne in 1948. When we add to those the Sultan of Brunei in the South China sea it is as if oil is a pickling fluid akin to formaldehyde projecting into the 21st century simulacra of the Anciens Regimes of former times. Pakistan, with its notorious 'feudals', does not have oil but enjoys an intimate pact with the oil sheikhdoms. The paradox here for liberal, bourgeois and nationalist forces in the Middle East was that the power that should have been their great ally, the United States, actually blocked them at every turn and preferred to do business with royal absolutists.

The US-sponsored Arabian and Gulf regime associates the West with corruption, autocracy and stagnation at a time when there is a yearning for a new start in the Arab world. The dilemma of US policy is that it understandably wishes to avoid a 'clash of civilisations' while remaining fearful of renewal within the Muslim world. It was a tribute to Washington's diplomacy that its assault on Afghanistan aroused so little official censure in the Muslim world, but an indication of the fragility of this success that no Muslim state was willing to play an active and public role in the attack. Notwithstanding continuing corrections and adjustments--dumping the terms 'crusade' and 'infinite justice' for the campaign against Al Qaeda, strenuously cultivating old and new Muslim allies--the US failed to extricate itself from the strategic trap it faces. It prefered to talk of war than of a police operation. And it was planning a new government in Afghanistan based on 'moderate' Taliban and Northern warlords and mercenary tribal elders under the aegis of the former monarch, Zahir Shah. So far as the wider Islamic world is concerned this strategy simultaneously offends the Islamicists and those who yearn for more democracy, autonomy and self-respect. Religious fanatics and bourgeois or petty-bourgeois democrats are not natural allies--in Iran they are at loggerheads--but in the territories where the United States has allied itself with feudal and autocratic reaction these two currents find a common antagonist. The White House may genuinely believe that the interests of global capitalism are best promoted by its pact with the oil dynasties and their Pakistani and Egyptian hangers-on, but this is not true. The pact may deliver slightly cheaper oil, and privileges to Western oil corporations, but it stifles the growth of an autonomous business culture and circuits of accumulation in the region itself. The resulting frustrations create conditions which politicise religious fanaticism, especially in those countries where such fanaticism is one of the few officially-tolerated species of public activity.

The US attack on Afghanistan was certainly anticipated. Just a few days before September 11 Massoud, the commander of the anti-Taliban forces, was assassinated by agents of Al Qaeda, posing as journalists. This action was calculated to both please and strengthen the Taliban, by ridding them of their most dangerous enemy, and to leave the United States with less credible local allies. The warlords of the Northern Alliance are dependent on autocratic governments in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan that are seen as stooges of neighbouring powers. With all its failings the Northern Alliance is preferable to the Taliban, but it does not represent a force for democracy and does not shield the invaders from the charge of being alien to Islam. Matters will not be improved by giving key positions to 'moderate Taliban' and royalists. This approach risks the worst of both world--discouraging those who yearn for a more tolerant social order, for secular progress and for an Afghan regime not beholden to foreigners while failing to win over or appease the religious fanatics, or seriously to erode their appeal.

Washington strives not to inflame Muslim opinion, or to allow the conflict to be defined as a war of religions. It hopes that the danger can be avoided by allowing its Muslim allies to adopt a low profile, or even to stand aside. The UN may be handed responsibility for occupied areas of Afghanistan but Iranian and Egyptian proposals that the UN should take charge of the anti-terrorism campaign were rejected. Given the UN's long history giving cover to US military campaigns, from Korea to Kosovo, entrusting it with nominal responsibility post facto will be of limited value in averting the danger of a 'clash of civilisations'. The UN could sponsor an accord against terrorism and the creation of a supranational force to police it. But such an approach would have little legitimacy if credible governments from the Muslim world are excluded. An international and supranational approach would be far more effective longterm at tackling terrorism than a US-led and defined 'war'.but will not easily be accepted in Washington since it would challenge imperial ideology and control. The Bush team see themselves as champions of the American people and US capitalism but in fact neither require direct US control of Middle Eastern oil, as we will see below.

The most difficult thing for the strategists of Empire to perceive, or explain to the American people, is that the best and perhaps only effective coalition against Al Qaeda and the Taliban will be one that they do not lead and do not control. The leaflets dropped on with the food packages carried a message that this was a contribution from 'The Partnership of Nations' in English and Pushtu. The use of this hollow rubric--perhaps sounding like United Nations in translation--testified to a deficit of legitimacy. The United States has standing against Al Qaeda because of what its citizens have suffered at its hands. But nobody really believes that the Taliban ordered the September 11.

While I will focus on Washington's sins of omission and commission I believe it would be wrong to slight the ability of the Bush administration to impose its own definitions on domestic opponents, and on allies and even enemies, abroad. The US president has sometimes been presented as a figure of fun but this has not stopped him having the last laugh on those who ridiculed him. Unlike more brilliant leaders he surrounds himself with a capable and experienced team, and sometimes heeds words of caution. The secret of his strength--and his fatal flaw--may be the instinctive rapport he enjoys with those gripped by US national messianism, the idea that only the United States can tackle the really big global threats and that whatever the US does is ipso facto favourable to freedom. These sentiments are often accompanied by deprecation of international organisations, an unwillingness to consider global complexities, or to contemplate any sacrifice of US sovereignty. The casualties on September 11 were on a terrible scale but our world bristles with these and greater dangers, notably that of encouraging a 'clash of civilisations' linked to weapons of mass destruction.

Jonathan Schell has drawn out attention to what he calls, in a book of that name, The Unfinished Twentieth Century. Schell argues that with the end of the Cold War in 1989, and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the huge apparatus of nuclear deterrence became redundant, yet it was neither scrapped or negotiated away. Russia, China and the other nuclear powers were not invited to dismantle--or even to drastically reduce--their nuclear weapons systems. The 1972 treaty against biological weapons was useless because there was no enforcement agency nor mandatory inspection. Sixty major overseas US military bases were maintained in forty countries, backed up by over seven hundred other military installations. What was true of weapons systems and overseas bases also applied to alliances. NATO was not disbanded, nor widened to include Russia. Instead it expanded eastwards and a type of ghostly and surreptitious Cold War against unnamed 'global competitors' (actually Russia and China) was perpetuated.

Also still in place was that palimpsest of alliances inherited from colonialism and the Cold War, so that the United States entered the new century encumbered and compromised by all that was most backward-looking and discredited in the Islamic world. During the Cold war the military confrontation was precariously regulated by the 'balance of terror'. Today not only is this lacking but the 'war against terrorism' will stoke Muslim resentment in a widening arc of states and could eventually give Al Qaeda the influence it aims at in a nuclear state. The dangers of an escalation of terror, and of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, are very much increased if hundreds of millions of people believe themselves to be nursing legitimate grievances.

The imperial role is justified on the grounds that the United States has a special destiny as world leader and champion of freedom. These roles, it is believed, require Washington to meet the threat of rogue states acquiring weapons of mass destruction, to pre-empt 'global competitors', to secure sources of scarce raw materials (especially oil), and to guarantee the personal security of ordinary Americans. Yet the truth is that the empire does not secure these goals, and actually makes 'blowback' more likely, as Chalmers Johnson so presciently argued. A healthier US polity could dispense with the cumbersome and expensive apparatus of empire, set the scene for a broader, more pluralistic global capitalism, and promote the competence and authority of supranational agencies in the fields of disarmament, anti-terrorism and peace-keeping. But the vested interests which stand in the way of these goals are those of a bloated military-industrial complex and re-charged presidency.

Neoconservativism

neo-conservatism:
(abbreviated as neo-con or neocon) is part of a U.S. based political movement rooted in liberal Cold War anticommunism and a backlash to the social liberation movements of the 1960s and 1970s.They emphasize foreign policy, where they advocated aggressive anticommunism, U.S. global dominance, and international alliances. Although they attacked feminism, gay rights, and multiculturalism, "neocons" often placed less emphasis on social policy issues, and many of them opposed school prayer or a ban on abortion. In addition, many neocons supported limited social welfare programs and nonrestrictive immigration policies."

American Enterprise Institute:
The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (AEI) is an extremely influential, pro-business right-wing think tank founded in 1943 by Lewis H. Brown. It promotes the advancement of free enterprise capitalism, and succeeds in placing its people in influential governmental positions. It is the center base for many neo-conservatives.


Project for the New American Century (PNAC) is another neo-conservative think tank with strong ties to the American Enterprise Institute. PNAC's web site says it was "established in the spring of 1997" as "a non-profit, educational organization whose goal is to promote American global leadership [and military dominance]."

PNAC's policy document, "Rebuilding America's Defences," openly advocates for total global military domination. Many PNAC members hold highest-level positions in the George W. Bush administration.

On January 26 1998 The PNAC sent a letter to then U.S president Bill Clinton calling for him to invade Iraq...The letter said:

The Honorable William J. Clinton
President of the United States
Washington, DC

Dear Mr. President:

We are writing you because we are convinced that current American policy toward Iraq is not succeeding, and that we may soon face a threat in the Middle East more serious than any we have known since the end of the Cold War. In your upcoming State of the Union Address, you have an opportunity to chart a clear and determined course for meeting this threat. We urge you to seize that opportunity, and to enunciate a new strategy that would secure the interests of the U.S. and our friends and allies around the world. That strategy should aim, above all, at the removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime from power. We stand ready to offer our full support in this difficult but necessary endeavor.

The policy of “containment” of Saddam Hussein has been steadily eroding over the past several months. As recent events have demonstrated, we can no longer depend on our partners in the Gulf War coalition to continue to uphold the sanctions or to punish Saddam when he blocks or evades UN inspections. Our ability to ensure that Saddam Hussein is not producing weapons of mass destruction, therefore, has substantially diminished. Even if full inspections were eventually to resume, which now seems highly unlikely, experience has shown that it is difficult if not impossible to monitor Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons production. The lengthy period during which the inspectors will have been unable to enter many Iraqi facilities has made it even less likely that they will be able to uncover all of Saddam’s secrets. As a result, in the not-too-distant future we will be unable to determine with any reasonable level of confidence whether Iraq does or does not possess such weapons.

Such uncertainty will, by itself, have a seriously destabilizing effect on the entire Middle East. It hardly needs to be added that if Saddam does acquire the capability to deliver weapons of mass destruction, as he is almost certain to do if we continue along the present course, the safety of American troops in the region, of our friends and allies like Israel and the moderate Arab states, and a significant portion of the world’s supply of oil will all be put at hazard. As you have rightly declared, Mr. President, the security of the world in the first part of the 21st century will be determined largely by how we handle this threat.

Given the magnitude of the threat, the current policy, which depends for its success upon the steadfastness of our coalition partners and upon the cooperation of Saddam Hussein, is dangerously inadequate. The only acceptable strategy is one that eliminates the possibility that Iraq will be able to use or threaten to use weapons of mass destruction. In the near term, this means a willingness to undertake military action as diplomacy is clearly failing. In the long term, it means removing Saddam Hussein and his regime from power. That now needs to become the aim of American foreign policy.

We urge you to articulate this aim, and to turn your Administration's attention to implementing a strategy for removing Saddam's regime from power. This will require a full complement of diplomatic, political and military efforts. Although we are fully aware of the dangers and difficulties in implementing this policy, we believe the dangers of failing to do so are far greater. We believe the U.S. has the authority under existing UN resolutions to take the necessary steps, including military steps, to protect our vital interests in the Gulf. In any case, American policy cannot continue to be crippled by a misguided insistence on unanimity in the UN Security Council.

We urge you to act decisively. If you act now to end the threat of weapons of mass destruction against the U.S. or its allies, you will be acting in the most fundamental national security interests of the country. If we accept a course of weakness and drift, we put our interests and our future at risk.

Sincerely,

Elliott Abrams Richard L. Armitage William J. Bennett

Jeffrey Bergner John Bolton Paula Dobriansky

Francis Fukuyama Robert Kagan Zalmay Khalilzad

William Kristol Richard Perle Peter W. Rodman

Donald Rumsfeld William Schneider, Jr. Vin Weber

Paul Wolfowitz R. James Woolsey Robert B. Zoellick

How it all connects: Afg-Pak relations

ABUL - In 1989, the Soviet Army withdrew from Afghanistan. Simultaneously, the West disengaged from the Afghan conflict, which left the Afghans at the mercy of regional powers. The collapse of the communist bloc provoked a shift in US policy in
the region. Because the US lacked a strategic interest in Afghanistan, Washington [delegated the formulation] of Afghan
policy to both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, which are two close allies of the US. The Saudis had no other interest in Afghanistan than the desire to create a government in Kabul that was hostile to Iran.

Although Iran shares a common language and culture with Afghanistan, it has historically had a limited influence on the country. This limited influence resulted from the religious differences between the Sunni-majority Afghanistan and the Shi'ite-majority Iran. With the blessing of the both the US and Saudi governments, Pakistan remained the major player in Afghanistan.

In 1992, the communist regime fell in Afghanistan; mujahideen groups entered Kabul, where two alternative options were presented to Pakistan. One option was to stabilize Afghanistan through mediation among major mujahideen leaders who lived in Pakistan. This option would have economically benefited Pakistan with open trade roads to Central Asian countries. The second option was to pursue the strategic goal of Pakistan, which consisted of having a puppet government in place and a fragile economy.

This option would have kept Afghanistan dependent on Pakistan both economically and politically. Ultimately, Pakistan's military elites opted for the second option, even though it went against the conventional wisdom of their own people. The military chose this option because it had always feared that a strong Afghanistan would pose a serious threat to Pakistan.

In fact, the creation of Pakistan is rooted in controversy. In 1947, Britain chose to partition India to create a new country for British India's Muslim minority. The creation of Pakistan was based on the assumption that the Muslim minority could not coexist with the majority Hindus. Currently, minority Muslims living in India appear satisfied with being engaged in the political process through a democratic mechanism.

Muslims who live in Pakistan, however, are denied basic rights by a military dictatorship. It is not surprising that Indian Muslims do not want to emigrate to Pakistan. It is evident that an individual's political and economic inspirations bypass his or her religious affinity; this notion was confirmed with the partition of Pakistan between East and West, when in 1971, the people of West Pakistan chose to become the sovereign state of Bangladesh.

The ethnic issue has indeed shattered the dreams of the founding father of Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, who envisioned Pakistan as a modern, democratic and pluralistic state. After his death, the domination of political and military power by Punjabis caused a growing resentment among other ethnic groups such as Bengalis, Sindhi, Balochis and Pashtuns.

Very much like Bengalis, who opted for partition from Pakistan, Balochis have also struggled for independence since the creation of Pakistan. They refused to become part of Pakistan until 1948; in that year, the military forced Balochi leaders to adhere to Pakistan. For instance, the current military conflict in Balochistan is the continuation of the Balochis' struggle for independence (like those of Kurds in Iraq).

Similarly, Pashtuns who live in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) will remain with Pakistan until they receive large enough monetary subventions from Pakistan's federal government. Pahstuns and Balochis live across the border in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Pakistan's military leaders fear Afghanistan's potential influence over Pashtuns and Balochis who live in Pakistan; this is because Pakistan lost its western territories due to the similar influence of India over Bengalis.

After losing the largest chunk of the territory to Bengalis, Pakistani leaders feared that similar dismembering could happen with the Balochi people in the east, and with Pashtuns in the NWFP. Pakistan is squeezed between two hostile countries - India and Afghanistan.

In addition, Pakistan has always viewed an economically prosperous and militarily strong Afghanistan as a threat to its existence; this is because a contentious borderline between the two countries exists. Upon the inception of Pakistan, the Afghan government resisted the membership of this new country in the UN because the question of the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan remained unresolved.

The long border between Afghanistan and Pakistan has never been officially ratified by the two countries. The existing borderline issue dates back to an old agreement - known as "The Durand Line" - between Afghanistan and British India. On November 12, 1898, the Afghan ruler, Emir Abdul Rahman Khan, and the foreign secretary of British India, Sir Henry Mortimer Durand, signed the demarcation line between British India and Afghanistan. Indeed, this border question has remained at the core of Pakistan’s negative policy on Afghanistan.

Pakistan's military has always feared that a strong Afghanistan would dispute the current border between the two countries. In addition, an economically prosperous Afghanistan would become more attractive to Pashtuns and Balochis who live in Pakistan, which is the result of their cultural affinity with the Afghans. Therefore, according to Pakistan's military leaders, a powerful government in Afghanistan would pose an existential threat to Pakistan.

In 1989, the US left Afghanistan at the mercy of regional powers, giving Pakistan an opportunity to accomplish its long-term strategic goal to make Afghanistan dependent on it. In fact, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 helped Pakistan achieve its strategic goals. The Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) had specific plans to destroy Afghanistan's military, economic and social infrastructures.

There are obvious examples of the ISI's clandestine involvement in Afghanistan. For instance, in 1992, mujahideen groups took over Afghanistan and agreed to share power by creating a coalition government in Kabul. As a result, Pakistan immediately ordered its best Afghan puppet, the militant Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, to disrupt normal life in Kabul with deadly rocket attacks.

As a result of the destruction, foreign embassies closed; the educated, prosperous people left the country. Similarly, the ISI instructed its agents across Afghanistan to destroy Afghanistan's military hardware, industrial machinery and all other equipment, which had been left by the Soviets.

Numerous poor and ignorant Afghans have collaborated with Pakistani agents to destroy factories military assets such as tanks and airplanes, and other sophisticated equipment. These were then sold in Pakistan for scrap. Eventually, Pakistan's puppet Taliban regime closed schools, universities and public offices in Afghanistan, in an effort to keep future generations in total ignorance and darkness.

Despite the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, which led to the liberation of Afghanistan from the ruthless Taliban and al-Qaeda terrorist network, Pakistan's policy has not changed in respect to its strategic goal in the country.

Since the arrival of coalition forces in Afghanistan, schools have been torched, economic development has been stalled, foreign experts have been beheaded, suicide bombers have flooded in from Pakistani madrassas, and Taliban and al-Qaeda allies have found a safe haven inside Pakistan.

In recent times, a consensus among North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military and intelligence officers has indicated that some in Pakistan's military turn a blind eye to the activities of the Taliban in Pakistan; further, this consensus has suggested that they collaborate with al-Qaeda.

The path to Afghanistan's stability is through Pakistan; it is the responsibility of the Afghan government and the coalition countries in Afghanistan to respond to the strategic concerns of Pakistan. Afghanistan is not in a position to get involved in the ethnic rift inside Pakistan. Also, the issue of the Durand Line between the two countries should be debated and settled with a plebiscite on both sides of the border.

Pakistan's Strategic Goals and the Deteriorating Situation in Afghanistan

PINR has an excellent intelligence report on Pakistan's strategic goals in Afghanistan and the deteriorating security of Afghanistan:

Pakistan is reeling under a host of problems and Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf seems unable to tackle them. With this, the frustration in the West is rising along with skepticism about Pakistan's role in Afghanistan. The president of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai, has been openly blaming Pakistan for the deteriorating security environment in his country. A few months ago, the BBC acquired a paper written by a senior official at the Defense Academy run by the U.K. Ministry of Defense. The paper alleges that Pakistan's intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (I.S.I.), has been indirectly supporting the Taliban. The paper continues to argue that Pakistan's promotion of terrorism cannot be tackled unless the I.S.I. is dismantled and Pakistan moves away from the rule of the military.

While the Bush administration continues to support Pakistan's government publicly, during a recent trip to Islamabad U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney invoked the U.S. Congress' growing frustration with Pakistan by underlining the Democratic Party's threat to make aid conditional on a crackdown of Islamic militants in Pakistan's tribal areas, which are located on the border with Afghanistan.

As if this were not enough, Musharraf's decision to sack the chief justice of Pakistan's Supreme Court, Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry, has ignited widespread public protests around the country and his government's heavy-handed handling of the protests has made his position all the more tenuous. The protests are now acquiring pro-democracy overtones and have ripped off the thin veneer of democracy that Musharraf had given his regime.

Given Musharraf's self projection as a force that stands between the West and a group of nuclear-armed mullahs, he must be keenly aware that this uproar on the streets of Pakistan is not good for his own future as well as for regional stability.

Pakistan's Role as a Western Ally

Musharraf has touted his role as a close ally of the West ever since the Bush administration presented a clear choice to the Pakistani government of either supporting the United States in its invasion of Afghanistan and the larger global war on terrorism, or being accepted as a supporter of radical Islamic extremism.

There was always a perception that he was not doing as much as he could, but with the recent deterioration of the situation in Afghanistan and some of the controversial decisions made by him, he is finding it hard to answer his critics convincingly. While Pakistan has apprehended some key al-Qaeda leaders and has acquired actionable intelligence, it has also not done enough to crack down on al-Qaeda's rear base on the border with Afghanistan.

Despite the public pronouncements by the governments of the United States and the United Kingdom in support of Pakistan, the sharply rising Western casualty rates in Afghanistan are not only generating skepticism in these countries about Pakistan's efforts to rein in the Taliban, but they are also encouraging a rethink about Pakistan's relationship with the West and its role in the global war on terrorism.

In a clear indication that the United States is turning up the pressure on Pakistan to crack down on its tribal areas, former U.S. Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte cautioned the U.S. Congress that Pakistan remains a major source of Islamic extremism and that al-Qaeda leaders have found sanctuary in secure Pakistani hideouts. Moreover, according to Negroponte, the Taliban is back to rebuilding itself in Pakistan with full vigor.

Pak-Afghan Tensions on the Rise

Even as Iraq has been the focus of U.S. foreign policy, the situation in Afghanistan, the original target of Washington's war on terrorism, continues to deteriorate. Some five years after the United States went to war to defeat the Taliban, and three years after it declared an end to combat operations, the resurgence of the Taliban is haunting the U.S. military and its allies, and hopes for the emergence of a democratic Afghanistan have faltered. While the political institutions in the form of a constitution, a popularly-elected president, and a national parliament have been in place for some time now, their efficacy is increasingly being challenged by the rising violence and creeping fundamentalism.

Tension between Afghanistan and Pakistan has intensified sharply recently amid growing concern about the implications of Islamabad's failure to crack down on cross-border militancy. Bilateral ties are complicated by New Delhi's growing presence in Kabul, which may have serious consequences for the stabilization of Afghanistan and for India-Pakistan peace talks.

Progress toward stabilization and development in Afghanistan is being influenced heavily by India and Pakistan and the rivalry between them. Pakistan has always been suspicious of New Delhi and Kabul cooperating against it, and as India's influence in Kabul has increased in post-Taliban Afghanistan, Pakistan has stalled in its efforts to curb extremists. Its failure to contain cross-border militancy has been a key factor behind deteriorating relations with Afghanistan.

Relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan have long been complex, with Islamabad's military-intelligence establishment contributing to the defeat of Soviet troops before 1988; the overthrow of Soviet-backed President Muhammad Najibullah in 1992; and the capture of large areas of Afghanistan by the Taliban after 1994. Several long-standing strategic interests fueled Pakistan's involvement in these developments. It has long believed that it can gain "strategic depth" against India by influencing politics in Kabul, something Islamabad felt it achieved during the 1980s and 1990s. The perceived gains of the last two decades, however, have been increasingly under threat since the overthrow of the Taliban in 2001.

After the terrorist attacks in the United States, Musharraf had to choose between support for the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan and the "war on terrorism," or isolation as a backer of radical Islamic extremism. Musharraf promptly signed Pakistan up as an ally of Washington. This committed Pakistan to supporting efforts to stabilize Afghanistan and to strengthen the administration of President Hamid Karzai. However, there are considerable doubts about Islamabad's capacity, and commitment, to crack down on militants.

Kabul is deeply suspicious of Pakistan, on whom its security is largely dependent. Pakistan's I.S.I. is linked to the resurgence of the Taliban, whose leadership is thought to be operating from tribal border regions in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and in the North-West Frontier Province. The rejuvenation of the Taliban has potential benefits for Pakistan in bolstering its role as a frontline state in the war on terrorism, thereby securing engagement from the United States.

Musharraf has been unable to dismantle the infrastructure that has provided funding, training and arms for the Taliban, but the I.S.I. has been brought under more direct control since 2001. The security problems in Afghanistan can be linked to the military's continuing position as the predominant force in Pakistan, an institution that has, since the 1990s, viewed the Taliban as a means of controlling Afghanistan and undercutting India's influence there. Having focused exclusively on the Taliban, it would struggle to abandon it now.

Furthermore, the failure of the U.S.-led coalition to eliminate the Taliban after more than five years of fighting has likely made Islamabad seek to maintain relations with the Taliban in case the movement manages to secure some power in Afghanistan. Pakistan remains keen to prevent its "strategic encirclement" as a result of closer Delhi-Kabul ties. Islamabad is wary of Afghanistan (or India) exerting influence on restive populations in border regions such as Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier Province.

Kabul has repeatedly blamed Islamabad for a resurgence of the Taliban during the past year. The exchange of bitter rhetoric has intensified, with Karzai warning that a failure to bring peace to Afghanistan would be disastrous for the whole region, and accusing Pakistan of trying to "enslave" the Afghan people.

The deterioration in relations has manifested itself most recently in a dispute over suggestions from Pakistan that it will seal its 2,430 kilometer long border (1,510 miles) with fences and mines. Afghanistan, which does not recognize the border, has reacted strongly against the plan, arguing that it will divide families and will not end cross-border terrorism. Islamabad has insisted that three million Afghan refugees should return home as one way to prevent Pakistan from being used as a haven by extremists. Pakistan also suggested that drug traffickers from Afghanistan (which produces 90 percent of the world's heroin supply) are using their influence to campaign against the border plan.

Indo-Afghan Relations

Meanwhile, as tension between Pakistan and Afghanistan has increased, India's relations with Afghanistan have steadily improved. Unlike Pakistan, ties between India and Afghanistan are not hampered by the existence of a contiguous, and contested, border. Its support for the Northern Alliance (against the Pakistan-backed Taliban) in the 1990s strengthened its position in Kabul after 2001. Many members of the Alliance are members of the government or hold influential provincial posts.

New Delhi is one of Afghanistan's top six donors, having extended a US$500 million aid package in 2001 and recently increasing this by $50 million. Most of its aid is unconditional, directed largely at reconstruction projects, as well as education and rural development. India has also supported police training and the development of electoral machinery.

Kabul wants Indian businesses to take advantage of the low tax regime to help develop a manufacturing hub in areas such as cement, oil and gas, electricity, and in services including hotels, banking and communications. Karzai may not be deliberately crafting a Delhi-Kabul alliance against Islamabad, but he is certainly hoping to push Pakistan into taking his concerns more seriously. India has opened consulates in Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, Kandahar and Jalalabad, in addition to its embassy in Kabul. Pakistan has accused the Kabul embassy of spreading anti-Pakistani propaganda and views the establishment of the consulates as a way for New Delhi to improve intelligence gathering against it.

Indeed, the development of closer ties between Kabul and New Delhi has placed India's fragile relationship with Pakistan under even more pressure, as well as jeopardizing Pakistan-Afghanistan ties. It strengthens Pakistani fears of encirclement and of the implications of India's rising global status more widely.

As a result, Islamabad is working to prevent India from expanding its influence in Afghanistan. It has refused to allow the passage of goods and aid from India to Afghanistan. Plans to build a gas pipeline linking Iran, Pakistan and India are progressing slowly. In recognition of the role of India and Pakistan on Afghanistan's stabilization, the United States has urged India toward acknowledging some of Pakistan's concerns, and has avoided pushing the Indian military to play a peacekeeping role in Afghanistan to avoid exacerbating Pakistani sensitivities. India, however, is also a key partner for Washington in the region.

Conclusion

Security and stability in Afghanistan are dependent on relations between India and Pakistan and their ties to Kabul. Competition between New Delhi and Islamabad for influence in Afghanistan poses a threat to their peace process and to Afghan development. An improvement in ties between India and Pakistan could help to stabilize the situation, but peace talks are unlikely to yield substantial results in the short- to medium-term.

Report Drafted By:
Dr. Harsh V. Pant

Marrying an educated girl

SCENE: First night of the marriage. The Groom approaches the Bride and proposes to Kiss her. So Let us see what would be her reaction…

GIRL FROM DEPT OF PHYSICS:

Well kissing is relative. You can kiss me with Respect to me Or with respect to you. First define how you Are going to Kiss. You can kiss me by treating me in the Same reference frame as You are or treating me in a different inertial Frame by producing Waves of motion through your lips. How do you Prefer?

The guy faints

GIRL FROM DEPT OF MATHEMATICS:

Kissing is fine. You can kiss me provided you Satisfy the Following conditions :
Necessary conditions: You should be close to Me by a distance Delta where delta is greater than zerO and the Limit for delta Tends to zero and you satisfy the closure Property.
Sufficient conditions: You should have lips. Where the number Of lips is neither more than two nor less than Two. You can Also kiss by defining your hand to be me if And only if you satisfy The above conditions.

The guy goes mad.

GIRL FROM Computer Science:

You want to kiss me. That is fine I assume that you know the Algorithm for that very well. But you have to Complete the Process within 56.22 seconds or else Connection will be timed Out. To optimize the timing lets do parallel Processing. As we have to Discuss about our future and other things, let Us do the process of Discussion foreground and why can’t you put The process of Kissing Background?

The guy applies for divorce.

GIRL from Electronics Engineering:

So you would like to kiss me. The process of Kissing is an age Old communication process. The information Content of the Signal transmitted from one pair of lips to The other is more if the Probability of the event (of kissing) is less.
Hence take Care. If you want a successful communication Between us, You should kiss me less often. If the Information content is to be Infinite, you should never kiss me at all!

The guy is found hanging from fan next day.
So my friends get ready if you are going to marry an educated girl

Richard

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